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Abstract: The rise of emerging markets and the creation of the BRICS group point to changes 
in international governance. This paper takes into account the initiatives that have emerged 
within the BRICS grouping regarding global financial governance, and considers the possible 
impact of these institutions. Brazil and China are very different countries, even though both are 
part of the BRICS and share common interests regarding the promotion of development and 
greater influence for developing countries over decision-making processes. In this sense, this 
paper differentiates China’s and Brazil’s positions in relation to the new financial institutions, 
in order to assess how each might influence them and benefit from them. We argue that China 
will most likely benefit the most from these new institutions and have increasing influence over 
them, while Brazil will most likely have a more marginal role due to recent domestic 
developments that have shifted the country’s perception of priorities. Also, while China has a 
clear plan of engagement in international financial governance ranging from new sources of 
credit for development to the internationalization of its national currency to the detriment of the 
dollar, Brazil seems to not have such a clear agenda for its interests in international financial 
governance besides increasing developing countries’ influences over decision-making 
processes. The new BRICS institutions present an important opportunity for the BRICS 
countries to change the rules of international financial governance. How much each member 
country will influence this process will depend on their engagement with these recently 
inaugurated institutions. 
 
Keywords: China, Brazil, BRICS, Finance, NDB, CRA 
 
Introduction 
The influence the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) as a group 
have over international politics has increased since the creation of the BRICS, leading its 
members to seek greater engagement in international governance. Since then, the BRICS have 
become more than a mere forum of coordination among emerging markets on the sidelines of 
international organizations. The group now has annual summits where further cooperation 
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initiatives and policy coordination are promoted. Nowadays, the group is engaged in the active 
promotion of changes and reforms in the international system, including the creation of 
complimentary yet alternative institutions when deemed necessary. This has been the case, 
especially in the financial and monetary systems. 
The 2008 financial crisis marks an important change in the perception of emerging 
countries’ roles and their engagement in international financial governance. After the crisis, 
emerging markets, especially the BRICS, came to be regarded as important actors that should 
take part in international financial governance so that economic stability could effectively be 
achieved.  Since the crisis, the financial G20 became institutionalized and its meetings acquired 
more importance, the BRICS have pressed for the reform of the traditional organizations the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, and the BRICS have also proposed 
complementary financial institutions and instruments that are also alternatives to the existing 
ones. 
Nevertheless, inside the BRICS, the influence that each country exercises in determining 
the agenda to be pursued is asymmetrical. This paper focuses on the difference between 
Brazilian and Chinese influence over the BRICS initiatives towards international financial 
governance. We focus on the demands made by the group regarding greater voice and the end 
of conditionalities in the traditional organizations, and the proposal of their own financial 
organizations, especially the New Development Bank (NDB) and the Contingent Reserve 
Agreement (CRA), seeking to determine Brazilian and Chinese roles. 
The purpose of this paper is to observe how Brazil and China have influenced the 
BRICS’ financial initiatives. Observing how these initiatives reflect the interests of China and 
Brazil will help us determine which country has the potential to benefit most from them. The 
BRICS’ initiatives have the potential of providing benefits for both countries, but it will depend 
on how each country will be able to exert influence over the agenda’s definition inside the 
BRICS and the institutions itself. The BRICS is also an important means of power projection 
in the international system for its member countries. The country that has more influence inside 
the group will be able to project it in international financial governance through the 
complimentary yet alternative institutions like the NDB and the CRA.  
We argue that, despite the BRICS’ rhetoric that no member state has more influence 
inside the group, there still are asymmetric relations that determine whether a country has more 
influence over the agenda-setting, leading to greater potential future advantages. After the 
crisis, both countries were in a relatively comfortable situation, having suffered mild impacts 
on their economies as a consequence of the crisis. China consolidated its position as a key 
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economic actor, providing liquidity and sustaining economic growth, avoiding a bigger 
downturn in the world economy. Brazil managed to sustain economic growth at first but, unlike 
China, was negatively affected by the downturn in commodity prices that followed the financial 
crisis. The country was then overcome by an economic downturn simultaneous to domestic 
instabilities stemming from a large-scale graft investigation in different levels of Brazilian 
politics. These events diminished Brazil’s stance in the BRICS, giving China more room to lead 
the group and have more influence over agenda-setting.  
In order to meet the purpose of this paper, we first make a short review of how the 
BRICS went from investment destination to the voice of the developing world. In another 
section, we observe the BRICS’ role in the post-crisis moment and the group’s relationship with 
the traditional institutions. Then we discuss the BRICS’ financial initiatives and which 
countries have had greater influence over this agenda. Later, we make a short comment on how 
China and Brazil - although in the same group - have very different priorities, interests, and 
policy strategies regarding international financial governance. 
 
The BRICS: from investment destination to discontents with the international order 
The term BRIC was first used by Goldman Sachs’ economist Jim O’Neil (2001) to refer to a 
group of emerging countries considered good enough as investment destinations. Later, the 
governments of these countries decided to get together on the margins of the United Nation’s 
General Assembly to better cooperate and coordinate their positions. After the financial crisis, 
in 2009, the group institutionalized its meetings, establishing annual summits to promote further 
cooperation and coordination. At this stage, South Africa was included so that Africa would be 
represented in the group which became the main voice of developing countries in the 
international arena. 
The traditional power asymmetries consolidated in the international order are, 
notwithstanding, an important issue that brings the BRICS together in an effort to cooperate 
and coordinate their policies, in order to promote an international order where these countries 
have influence according to their capabilities and significance for the international economy. 
The BRICS want more influence over decision-making processes in international governance 
which corresponds to their newly acquired power capabilities. These are the result of their 
recent process of economic growth and development. China and Brazil share the same belief: 
that the international order needs to be revised so as to better attend to the peace and 
development agenda of emerging countries (Becard et al., 2015). In this sense, the countries 
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seek changes in the existing international governance institutions that are embedded in a power 
structure that no longer corresponds to the international reality.  
The existing international order was built under American hegemony and prioritizes the 
interests of the hegemonic power and its closest allies. Sometimes, international institutions are 
used to serve the narrow ends of the hegemonic power, disregarding the needs of other countries 
(Acharya, 2014). This is the BRICS countries’ perception about the traditional financial 
institutions. The 2000s witnessed the rise of formerly underdeveloped countries to the status of 
emerging markets through impressive growth rates sustained over a significant period of time. 
It is assumed that a country will try to have greater influence over the international order if its 
power increases (Gilpin, 1981). This is because states seek to increase their power capabilities 
so that they can exert greater influence over international governance and keep themselves safer 
(Gilpin, 1981). For developing countries like Brazil and China, more influence over 
international governance also implies a more favorable environment for the maintenance of the 
economic growth and development these countries have recently had. 
Since the international order is based on power distribution, it is expected that emerging 
countries will demand changes in the international order so that it reflects their newly acquired 
power capabilities (Gilpin, 1981).  This is what the BRICS is about, seeking a louder voice and 
more room for the BRICS to influence the future of the international order. China, specifically, 
has received a lot of pressure to act like a “responsible stakeholder”, in Robert Zoellick’s words. 
The BRICS have become an important tool through which China has been working on a bigger 
role in global governance and being a responsible stakeholder, using the proposition of new 
rules and institutions. Of course, Zoellick’s words were not meant to be an encouragement to 
Chinese leadership over the international system, but that China should refrain from disturbing 
the existing international order. 
The dissatisfaction and interest in taking a more active role in governance can be 
observed in the financial and monetary international systems. International financial and 
monetary governance is mostly led by institutions created under American hegemony, such as 
the IMF, the World Bank, and the Bank for International Settlements. Also, the United States’ 
Treasury has the sole dominance of the dollar, the international reserve currency. We focus on 
the first two institutions, since the BRICS’ initiatives in this field are directed at complementing 
and becoming an alternative to both the World Bank and the IMF. The BRICS’ (and other 
developing countries’) main issue with both institutions is the imposition of conditionalities, 
restricting access to credit in exchange for the suitability of domestic economic policies to their 
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liberal spelling book resumed in the Washington Consensus. Another important point of 
discontentment is the lack of proper representation in these institutions. 
Both China and Brazil have had different experiences with the IMF and the World 
Bank’s conditionalities and policy recommendations. On the one hand, China listened to the 
World Bank’s recommendations, but applied only what it deemed to be useful and in 
accordance with the country’s interests (Arrighi, 2008). China’s development path is guided 
much more in accordance with the Chinese Communist Party’s guidelines than international 
pressure. On the other hand, Brazil borrowed a great sum of money from these institutions and 
followed the recommendations of the Washington Consensus, despite some adaptations like the 
strengthening of the state in the promotion of development and the maintenance of protectionist 
trade policies (Ban & Blyth, 2013). Each country’s choice had a major impact on the 
development road that each followed. In China, privatization and the deregulation of markets 
came at a slow pace, with the focus being the development of the national economy without 
creating domestic instability as a result of these economic changes (Arrighi, 2008). In Brazil, 
privatization and deregulation were adopted according to the neoliberal recipe while seeking to 
maintain the government’s control over the development process. China has also maintained 
strong control over foreign direct investment in the country (Arrighi, 2008). China’s capital 
account is still very closed in relation to the neoliberal standards. This means that capital flows 
in the country are still under the strong control of the government, despite continuous pressure 
from the traditional institutions and the developed countries for the deregulation of capital flows 
in China. Currency control is another issue in which China does not follow the traditional 
international guidelines. Even though the Chinese government recently took steps in the 
direction of further liberalizing the renminbi’s exchange rate, it backtracked in face of possible 
instabilities. Nevertheless, both Brazil and China position themselves against the imposition of 
conditionalities.  
Another common demand between Brazil and China, and the other BRICS as well, is 
for better representation for emerging countries in the IMF and the World Bank. Brazil, for 
once, has linked the increase in developing countries’ participation to achieving more effective 
international governance (Bosco & Stuenkel, 2015). The influence of a country over the 
decision-making process of the traditional institutions is given by the voting quota that is 
calculated by taking into account the contribution of a country to the organization and economic 
indices that measure the importance of a country in the international economy, its GDP for 
example, at the moment of their accession to the organization. This means that many developing 
countries have voting quotas that no longer correspond to the size of their contribution to the 
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organization and economic significance. According to Martin Jacques (2009), a global 
economic regime where the BRICS countries have greater influence would be more democratic 
than the existing one. 
The United States has veto power in both institutions and the European countries - if 
coordinated - could also veto decisions in these organizations. In the World Bank, for example, 
the developed countries make the rules, while developing countries are the ones to actually use 
the Bank for loans (Strand & Retzl, 2016). In 2010, there was a revision of the quotas that 
increased mostly the quotas of developing countries. Nonetheless, the US and European states 
continue to have veto power, while the BRICS - even if combined - do not. This reform was 
only ratified by the US Congress in 2015.  
Today, China plays an important role not only as a recipient of World Bank credit, but 
as a significant contributor. China has an extensive program of aid for development using its 
own domestic institutions and contributing to traditional ones. China has become an important 
contributor to the World Bank, and is becoming an important alternative source of international 
aid for development (Reich & Lebow, 2014). Also, during the crisis, China made important 
capital transfers, especially to the IMF, in order to help provide enough resources to reign in 
the consequences of the economic instability that followed suit. In relation to the IMF, Brazil 
is progressively leaving the position of a mostly borrower to become a creditor nation. In 2010, 
the country increased its contribution buying US$10 billion worth of IMF-backed notes (Bosco 
& Stuenkel, 2015). Brazil is also among the top borrowers of the World Bank. Unlike China, 
Brazil has not become a major contributor to the World Bank’s initiatives for investment in 
development (Bosco & Stuenkel, 2015).  
The countries that make up the BRICS are different among themselves in terms of 
economics, culture, and political systems, but all these countries share a discontentment with 
the existing international order and their insufficient influence over international decision-
making processes, despite their status as emerging economies. These differences entail that the 
influence each country exerts over the group is asymmetrical, and that the BRICS will not 
always share the same interests among themselves. Even though all the member states are 
emerging economies, some are in a farther stage of development than others. For instance, there 
is a clear economic gap between China and the rest of the BRICS. This fact becomes important 
when we take into account the BRICS’ cooperation in economic issues. While China is still a 
developing country, it is already the second largest economy in the world. Brazil’s economic 
performance on the last two decades - though stable - has been modest, resulting in more modest 
influence and prestige (Porzecanski, 2015). 
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Also, China has had more success in the process of the internationalization of its 
economy than Brazil, which aggravates this asymmetric relation between both countries 
(Becard et al., 2015). In this sense, China seems to have greater influence, at least over 
economic issues, inside the group. Nevertheless, the discourse of the group is that no country 
solely leads the grouping, but that each member state makes important contributions. These 
differences, though, played a significant role in how each BRICS country contributed in the 
aftermath of the crisis. 
 
The 2008 crisis and international financial governance 
The 2008 financial crisis has had a major impact on the international economy, bringing 
important lessons to the fore and changes in emerging countries’ roles in international financial 
and monetary governance. The first major lesson from the crisis was that the developed markets 
were not immune to crises. This revealed the intrinsic vulnerabilities of countries such as the 
BRICS whose economies depend on those of the developed markets. For example, Brazil 
depends on foreign markets’ demands for its commodities, while China depends on their 
demands for Chinese manufactured products.  
The second major lesson was that the United States’ ability to maintain a stable 
international economy was under dispute, since the crisis originated in that country itself. The 
predominance of the dollar was also perceived to be under threat in the face of the American 
inability to underwrite the existing international economic system (Jacques, 2009). The US, 
once regarded as the source of stability for the world economy, came to be seen as a source of 
economic instability, and the country is the largest debtor in the world (Reich & Lebow, 2014). 
This does not mean that the United States did not act to help control the effects of the crisis, but 
that it could not do so without the participation of emerging countries. The United States’ action 
in the post-crisis moment was crucial to its management (Nye, 2015).  
It is expected that a hegemonic power will provide order and stability in the international 
system during the period of its dominance (Gilpin, 1981). When the hegemonic power is no 
longer able to keep up its duties or is regarded as a source of instability, discussions arise about 
the possible decline of the hegemonic power. This, in turn, leads to the perception that there is 
room for emerging powers to increase their influence over the order and governance of the 
system. Observing the international economic regimes and governance structures, it is possible 
to observe such a dynamic nowadays. 
After the crisis, it was expected that the G8 would be called in a meeting to address to 
possible effects of the crisis that exploded in the United States. Instead, the G20, a little-known 
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institution which incorporated emerging markets, including Brazil and China, was called by 
then-President George W. Bush to address the issue at hand. At the time, the group declared 
itself the most important forum for economic cooperation (Bosco & Stuenkel, 2015). This 
represented the end of developed countries’ capability to solve a major international economic 
crisis without active help from large emerging economies (Jacques, 2009). Overall, the crisis 
revealed that developing countries from then on were required to take part in efforts for the 
stabilization of the international economy - countries that previously were considered 
unqualified to take part in this kind of responsibility (Brzezinski, 2012). It also pointed to 
American inability to maintain its leadership over the world economy in the long haul 
(Brzezinski 2012). 
China had a major role in sustaining global economic activity and reducing the strength 
and endurance of the crisis’ consequences by acting as an important source of international 
liquidity in the post-crisis scenario. The Chinese government’s commitment to the maintenance 
of international economic stability led to the country assuming the role of liquidity provider and 
becoming a major promoter of economic growth. China’s major post-crisis stimulus package 
to its domestic economy, along with the US’ stimulus package, was important to assure that the 
global recession would not last long (Cohen, 2017). Later, China was an important actor, 
purchasing European bonds that helped control the Eurozone crisis. As stated by Simon Reich 
and Ned Lebow: 
“(…), heavy Chinese support for the dollar and the euro, unprecedented aid and 
investment in the Global South, timely intervention through capital infusions to 
support American banks, record investments overseas, the stabilization of currency 
exchange, and the incremental convertibility of the RMB have all been essential to 
preserving global economic stability since 2007”. (Reich & Lebow, 2014: 128) 
In 2011, China became the world’s greatest lender when the country’s holding of US Treasury 
bills reached US$1.16 trillion (Reich & Lebow, 2014). China is beginning to occupy a place 
that usually belongs to the hegemonic power in the system: the lender of last resort, the provider 
of liquidity. The control over international liquidity is deemed import, since through it a country 
can obtain military superiority, especially because military technologies are increasingly more 
capital intensive (Arrighi, 2008). 
 China’s economy was affected by the 2008 crisis in the sense that it reduced 
consumption from developed countries, the main destination for its exports. This, in its turn, 
reduced China’s demand for commodities, negatively affecting commodity-exporting 
developing economies like Brazil which also faced the reduction of demand from developed 
countries due to the crisis. Nevertheless, Brazil had a positive posture in the post-crisis, 
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exemplified by the then-Brazilian President, Luis Inácio Lula da Silva’s claims that Brazil 
would be hit only by a small wave of the crisis, the country therefore having nothing to fear. 
Later, though, the country was fully hit by economic downturn when the commodities prices 
fell in the international market due to the decline in international demand.  
The crisis ignited a domestic debate and efforts in China to promote a shift in the 
country’s economic model, to lessen its dependence on foreign markets and increase its 
domestic consumption base (Christensen, 2015). Brazil did not engage in such an effort, 
remaining strongly dependent on commodity exports, even though the crisis burst the bubble 
in commodities prices and revealed the economic susceptibility due to dependency on primary 
products. These different economic choices made by China and Brazil will likely keep playing 
an important role in determining each country’s role and influence over international economic 
governance. Nonetheless, the BRICS as a group took important steps to increase the group’s 
influence over financial international governance, including the creation of new institutions. 
 
The BRICS and financial governance in the post-crisis 
The crisis and the evident inability of developed economies, especially the United States, to 
solve the economic issues at hand created an opportunity for the developing countries to 
enhance their influences, promote their demands for better representation in the traditional 
institutions, and propose new governance solutions of their own. In the post-crisis, the BRICS 
reinforced the pressure for demands regarding reform of the voting quotas in the IMF and the 
World Bank, and reinforce these countries’ uneasiness towards the conditionalities imposed by 
both institutions to credit access. An agreement was made in 2010 that revised the voting quotas 
in the IMF. In this agreement, most BRICS countries had their voting quotas increased, while 
the US and the European states had theirs decreased. The United States’ Congress failed to 
ratify the agreement, “even though it would cost the United States almost nothing’ (Nye, 2015).  
The agreement was only ratified by the Congress in 2015. 
The reforms brought by the 2010 agreement were not enough, since they did not remove 
the American veto power in the organization, and neither did any developing country or the 
sum of the BRICS countries come near to having a veto power in the organization. There is still 
an important gap between the US’ and the BRICS’ voting power in the traditional multilateral 
institutions. Voting power is important, as it is the measure of a country’s influence over the 
decision-making process of an institution (Strand & Retzl, 2016). Nevertheless, these countries 
reinforced their commitment to the traditional institutions through the increase of their 
contributions and ad hoc contributions to help provide liquidity during the crisis, primarily 
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China. The BRICS helped boost IMF emergency funds in face of the European crisis 
(Christensen, 2015).  
 Despite the BRICS’ commitment to the traditional institutions in which their influence 
is limited by the power structure inaugurated after World War II, they have worked towards 
their own complementary and alternative institutions. China and Brazil believe that the BRICS 
can be an important instrument to show that developing countries can assume the lead in the 
resolution of its own members’ development issues (Becard et al., 2015). In the BRICS Summit 
in 2009, it was decided that the viability of a development bank and a fund of their own would 
be studied by the BRICS’ member states. The proposition for such institutions came from India, 
and was discussed in the BRICS Summit held there in 2012 (Batista Jr., 2016). In Fortaleza, 
Brazil, 2014, the BRICS’ bank, named the New Development Bank, and the Contingency 
Reserve Agreement were created. Both institutions began to function in 2015.  
 
The Contingency Reserve Agreement  
The BRICS’ Fifth Summit Declaration and Action Plan claim that the purpose of the CRA is 
to protect BRICS countries from international monetary instabilities (BRICS, 2014). The 
CRA’s function is to complement the role of the IMF, issuing loans to help the BRICS countries 
correct any imbalances derived from international financial crises or capital speculation that 
might result in a loss of currency. The CRA could become an important instrument for the 
BRICS to reign in hard currency fluctuations as a result of speculation of their national 
currencies (Lima & da Silva, 2016). 
Each BRICS country contributes to the fund according to its economic capabilities. The 
total amount subscribed to the institution is US$100 billion. From the total, China has promised 
around US$41 billion, while Brazil has committed to US$18 billion (Rooney, 2014). This 
shows the gap between both countries’ contributions, which could later result in different levels 
of influence over the institution. It is important to point out that China holds the largest reserves 
in the world. 
 
The New Development Bank 
The NDB is the direct result of the BRICS’ dissatisfaction with the existing multilateral 
institutions in international financial governance (Batista Jr., 2016). The NDB’s purpose is to 
complement the role of the World Bank, issuing loans to promote investment for the sustenance 
of economic development in the BRICS and other developing countries. The NDB is focused 
on investments in infrastructure and green technologies. The focus on infrastructure is related 
Fernanda de Castro Brandão Martins  JCIR Special Issue (2018) 
46 
to the understanding that developing a good infrastructure web is important for a country’s 
development. Infrastructure is essential to a country’s economic efficiency, dynamism, and 
economic growth (Brzezinski, 2012). Also, estimates point out that the World Bank, the major 
provider of credit for development, does not have such a focus and does not have enough 
resources to attend to all the demand from the developing countries. There is a projection of a 
shortage of resources to fund infrastructure and sustainable development in the long run 
(Griffith-Jones, 2014). Also, the NDB promises to act in a faster and more efficient fashion 
without sacrificing quality, differently from the traditional organizations where access to loans 
can be a long and bureaucratic process (Batista Jr., 2016). 
The NDB’s authorized capital is US$100 billion; the subscribed capital is US$50 billion. 
It is expected that in 2022 the NDB’s paid-in capital will reach US$10 billion and could easily 
be able to reach US$13 billion if new members are admitted (Batista Jr., 2017). In comparison, 
the World Bank has a paid-in capital of US$16 billion and has few expectations of increasing 
this amount, since its greatest contributors, the US and European countries, do not seem inclined 
to increase their contributions (Batista Jr., 2017). Since the inauguration of the Trump 
government, the US has announced a series of cutbacks in its contributions to international 
organizations, including the IMF and the World Bank. These cuts will make it even more 
difficult for the World Bank to be capable of attending to development demands from around 
the globe in the long run. 
There is the potential for further expansion of the Bank’s reach, meaning that other 
developing countries might be able to be granted access to the NDB’s loans.  In this sense, the 
NDB is an institution with globally reaching ambitions (Batista Jr., 2017). The Bank’s purpose 
is to include members from all continents, but developed countries, though they could be 
granted membership, will not be able to get loans from the NDB (Batista Jr., 2016). The 
expansion of the Bank’s reach may become a controversial issue, since some of the BRICS 
countries would prefer the investment to be focused on the organization’s member states. 
Today, the expansion of the NDB to include new members faces opposition mainly from 
Russia, which is concerned about the financial restrictions the country faces in the international 
markets due to imposed sanctions, and which sees in the NDB an important source of financing 
in such a scenario (Batista Jr., 2017). New members of the Bank could include those responsible 
for the imposition of such sanctions. Another possible future issue of contention could be the 
balance among the BRICS’ different interests regarding the areas that should be targeted by the 
Bank. It might become an issue to get investments for areas in which China is not interested in 
investing (Becard et al., 2015). 
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The capital contribution to the Bank is equally divided among the members, meaning 
that each country is responsible for providing 20% of the total amount, which entails in an equal 
voting share for each country (Batista Jr., 2016). Unlike the IMF and the World Bank, no 
country has a veto power in the NDB, and decisions are made by a simple majority. So far, 
China has the Bank’s headquarters in Shanghai and Brazil holds the first Board of Directors’ 
presidency. Because of the political and economic instabilities surrounding Brazil, the country 
has not fully exercised its influence over the institution in the last couple of years. According 
to Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr (2017), a Brazilian former vice-president of the NDB, the country 
never represented itself in the governors’ meeting of the NDB.  Despite the discourse that China 
will not dominate the BRICS institutions, the reality is that the country’s superior contributions, 
economic size, and robustness might eventually result in its greater influence over the Bank’s 
dynamics. When Brazil does not represent itself in the NDB’s meetings, it opens space for 
China’s dominance over the institution. 
 
The new institutions’ impact on financial governance 
Even though the focus of this paper is not to assess the impacts of such institutions in global 
governance, it seems important to leave a note on its probable repercussions, since Brazil and 
China will be affected by it. Unlike the IMF and the World Bank, both institutions claim to 
impose no conditionalities in the sense of policy recommendations in exchange for credit 
access. This is an important difference in relation to the traditional institutions. For developing 
countries, in general, this represents an improvement and considerably reduces the costs of 
obtaining credit. This lack of standards for credit access is criticized by the developed countries 
that claim that it could become a means for non-democratic governments to obtain credit 
without fearing sanctions. 
Both the NDB and the CRA are new institutions, and their impact cannot be fully 
measured yet. Nevertheless, they seem to represent much more a supplement to than an 
undercutting of the existing international order at the moment (Christensen, 2015). Both 
institutions seem to follow the model of traditional institutions, but without the application of 
conditionalities. In this sense, they can impact the way credit is made available for development, 
changing long-established practices. It is important to note that Brazil is against the complete 
lack of social and environmental standards as a prerequisite for credit access, and believes that 
the total absence of such standards in the BRICS institutions would be a regression in relation 
to the traditional institutions (Becard et al., 2015).  
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 Another possible consequence of such institutions is that they allow a further 
internationalization of the BRICS’ national currencies. In this sense, Brazil and China have 
very different goals and interests. The successful internationalization of the RMB or the real 
could lead to a decrease in the dollar’s predominance in the international economy. So far, this 
still is a distant possibility. Overall, if the NDB and the CRA prove to be solid institutions, they 
may become important alternatives rivaling the traditional institutions for the promotion of 
development, crisis management, and could play an important role in bringing an end to the 
hegemony of the dollar. 
 
Other financial initiatives 
To present day, the NDB and the CRA are the only innovations brought by the BRICS to 
international financial governance that are completed and fully working. Nevertheless, there is 
a range of other financial institutions and mechanisms being evaluated in the sense of 
determining their viability. For example, there have been talks about a possible BRICS rating 
agency to rival Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s, but no formal step has been taken for the 
concretization of such an initiative so far. 
In the last summit in Xiamen, in September 2017, it was agreed that the BRICS would 
establish their own local currency bond fund, and there were also proposals for a transnational 
multilateral payments system (Gupta, 2017). China, for example, is already working on its own 
version of a payment system - China Union Pay - to rival Visa and MasterCard, and the Cross-
Border Interbank Payment System to rival the predominant SWIFT. This points to a crucial 
difference between China and Brazil in their engagement in the international financial and 
monetary system. While China is committed to the creation and innovation of institutions of 
global financial governance, Brazil though engaged with the BRICS initiatives, does not have 
a plan as clear as China’s about the position it desires to occupy in international financial 
governance. This reflects the difference in economic capabilities between both countries. Brazil 
does not have economic capabilities enough to create and promote its own financial instruments 
that might have a significant impact on the global economy. Also, it is not among the Brazilian 
agenda’s priorities that such a profound rupture with the existing institutions and instruments 
should occur, even though the country could benefit from these alternatives. 
  
China and Brazil: same bed, different dreams 
As a new decade of cooperation within the BRICS dawns, there are many roads the group could 
take. For Sourabh Gupta (2017), the BRICS should become an important forum for the 
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discussion and proposition of an alternative to the current international monetary system, 
adapted to today’s international capital flows. The BRICS, as the main voice of the developing 
world, could become increasingly indispensable for global governance. It is necessary, though, 
for the group to be able to keep an important level of cooperation among themselves and not 
let it be disturbed by eventual conflicts between its members and cleavages with the developed 
countries. 
Despite being the voice of the developing world, the BRICS is characterized by power 
asymmetry among its members. The continuance of Chinese ascension and Brazil’s muddling 
through economic and political instability could push the influence gap between both countries 
even larger. Brazil already is least committed to innovations in global financial governance in 
comparison to China, and these domestic issues may drive the country even farther from the 
leadership of initiatives of this type. In this sense, it is important for Brazil that it is not left 
behind in the reconfiguration of the BRICS institutions in international financial governance. 
China has declared itself a leader and champion of the developing world (Christensen, 2015), 
while Brazil struggles to keep the same level of influence as it had between the end of the 2000s 
and the beginning of the 2010s. China is moving forward, aiming for global leadership, while 
Brazil has had to put any such plans on hold for the time being, so it can reorganize its domestic 
politics. 
The BRICS and its initiatives were the focus of Brazilian foreign policy during President 
Lula’s terms (Bosco & Stuenkel, 2015), but the same cannot be said of his successor, President 
Rousseff. During Rousseff’s second term, Brazil distanced itself from the BRICS, focusing on 
the domestic political issues that arose as the result of investigations that culminated in the 
impeachment of President Rouseff due to crimes of responsibility, and a major graft 
investigation that has reached most Brazilian political parties, and institutions, and some major 
companies. Another reason for Brazil’s lack of energy in innovations in the area of international 
financial governance is that the Brazilian economy is a lot less integrated into the world 
economy than the Chinese’s. Today, Brazil is mostly marginalized from global production 
chains (Porzecanski, 2015), while China is the focal point of production chains in Southeast 
Asia and globally. 
 The difference in economic stances shapes the interests and commitment of both Brazil 
and China in relation to the reconfiguration of international financial governance. China is 
committed to the creation of a parallel order that will complement and be an alternative to the 
existing institutions. For that purpose, China is engaged in increasing the use of its national 
currency in the international system, which might lead to the further erosion of the dollar’s 
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position as the main reserve currency (Reich & Lebow, 2014). Brazil does not have the same 
dreams about the real. The Brazilian real is not among the most-traded currencies 
internationally, being less used than the RMB and the Indian rupee (Porzecanski, 2015). China 
seeks to use the international markets of capital and goods as a means of increasing national 
power and has pursued this with discipline and pragmatism (Arrighi, 2008). On the other hand, 
Brazil seems to struggle with how to efficiently use the international market in its favor. This 
suggests that China has very clear ideas about what it expects in terms of changes in 
international monetary and financial governance, meanwhile such goals may not be as clear to 
Brazil. Despite being co-members of the BRICS, China and Brazil might not always have the 
same interests in respect to financial governance; both countries’ interests will not always 
coincide. In sum, while China has a successful strategy of the integration of its economy 
globally, Brazil struggles with a lack of planning and uncoordinated institutional practices 
(Becard et al., 2015). 
It is important to note that Brazil is an important ally to China as it expands its 
investments and economic interests in Latin America. Nevertheless, such a close relationship 
can become negative, since Brazil lacks leverage in negotiating with China. The BRICS can be 
an important place where China and Brazil can come to terms with China’s growing presence 
in South America. 
In the last BRICS Summit, while China occupied the spotlight as a host with 
propositions for cooperation in different areas, and about the possibility of new members for 
the group, Brazil left the summit without any decisive proposition to strengthen the country’s 
role in the BRICS group (Exame, 2017). This recent trend in Brazilian foreign policy could be 
changed after presidential elections in 2018, if the newly elected president decides to strengthen 
Brazilian engagement with the BRICS and its institutions. 
 
Conclusion 
The BRICS has become the main voice of developing countries in international financial 
governance. Nevertheless, the group is characterized by asymmetries in economic capabilities 
among its member states, which gives them different levels of effective influence and interests 
in such issues. Brazil and China are very different countries in this sense.  
In the financial and monetary framework of governance, the group has developed its 
own new institutions that aim to complement and be an alternative to the traditional institutions 
based on the American hegemony of the system. While China is not only committed to the 
provision of institutions in the BRICS scope, it is also committed to creating its own alternatives 
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in the framework of financial governance. Brazil is mostly engaged in initiatives inside the 
BRICS’ scope, and even this engagement has been victim of increased disinterest and loss of 
priority in face of domestic economic and political instabilities.  
The BRICS has great potential to change the framework of international financial 
governance to become more favorable to emerging and developing countries’ needs and 
interests. Undoubtedly China will play a major role in this process, while Brazil will likely keep 
following Chinese leadership, playing a more marginal and discreet role. 
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